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This study is an application of social identity theory to feminist consciousness 
and activism. For women, strong gender identiﬁcations may enhance support 
for equality struggles, whereas for men, they may contribute to backlashes 
against feminism. University students (N � 276), primarily Euroamerican, 
completed a measure of gender self-esteem (GSE, that part of one’s self-
concept derived from one’s gender), and two measures of feminism. High 
GSE in women and low GSE in men were related to support for feminism. 
Consistent with past research, women were more supportive of feminism 
than men, and in both genders, support for feminist ideas was greater than 
self-identiﬁcation as a feminist. 
For many feminists working as part of the American women’s movement, 
feminism is an important group identity. For instance, members of the 
National Organization for Women generally identify themselves as femi­
nists. Negative stereotypes of feminism may threaten involvement in the 
women’s movement. People may agree with goals of the movement, but 
may avoid labeling themselves as feminists for fear of being associated with 
this socially stigmatized label. This fear may interfere with the development 
of the group identiﬁcation linked to collective action. 
FACTORS INFLUENCING SUPPORT FOR FEMINISM 
Research in the United States ﬁnds that terminology affects support for 
feminism (Breinlinger & Kelly, 1994; Buschman & Lenart, 1996; Jacobson, 
1981). In general, people respond more negatively to the term ‘‘feminist’’ 
than they do to ‘‘women’s movement,’’ even when they are sympathetic 
to the aims of feminism (Buschman & Lenart, 1996). In the United States, 
anti-feminist groups and the media portray feminists as unrepresentative 
of American women, anti-mother, man-hating, and lesbian (Burn, 2000; 
Pharr, 1988). Consequently, many women’s activists and organizations 
avoid the feminist label because of the perception that it reduces public 
support for women’s policies and programs. In developing countries, the 
feminist label is avoided because the term is associated with a narrow, 
Western view of women’s issues and strategies (Basu, 1995). 
Nontraditional gender-role attitudes and beliefs and nontraditional 
gender role experiences also inﬂuence support for feminism (Andersen & 
Cook, 1984; Banaszak & Plutzer, 1993; Morgan, 1996). Support for feminism 
is also related to negative experiences such as sexual harassment and gen­
dered violence (Buschman & Lenart, 1996; Komarovsky, 1985; Renzetti, 
1987). 
Group consciousness, an awareness of group membership combined 
with an evaluation of the group’s current status and desire for collective 
action, also appears to be a primary element in the development of 
feminism (Breinlinger & Kelly, 1994; Buschman & Lenart, 1996; Cook, 
1989; Henderson-King & Stewart, 1994; Gurin & Markus, 1989; Skevington 
& Baker, 1989; Williams & Giles, 1978). According to social identity theory, 
social identity is that part of an individual’s self-concept derived from his 
or her membership in some social group, along with the value and emotional 
signiﬁcance of that membership (Tajfel, 1981). Research based on social 
identity theory suggests that taking pride in the very group qualities used 
as a basis for discrimination and embracing their identities as members 
of a disadvantaged group justiﬁes equality struggles and motivates group 
activism (Dion, 1986; Gurin, Miller, & Gurin, 1980; Smith & Tyler, 1997; 
Walker & Mann, 1987). Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) call that part of 
one’s self-esteem derived from group memberships ‘‘collective self-
esteem.’’ Individuals from traditionally discriminated groups frequently 
score higher on measures of collective self-esteem than do individuals 
from socially dominant groups (Bat-Chava, 1994; Crocker & Major, 1989; 
Ellemers, 1993). 
Burn (1996) proposed that gender as a social identity may stimulate 
gender equality efforts on the part of women while simultaneously trig­
gering backlashes from men against these efforts. This may occur because 
awareness of women’s gender pride and of gender equality efforts may 
increase the salience of males’ sex-category membership and contribute to 
an in-group–out-group dynamic (us–them enemy perceptions). Indeed, 
some research indicates that gender category salience increases the salience 
of gender to the individual’s self-image (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Swan & 
Wyer, 1997), and that such salience is correlated with greater acceptance 
of traditional sex roles (Abrams, Thomas, & Hogg, 1990). 
This project examined the role of gender self-esteem (GSE) in support 
for feminism. Adapting the concept and measurement of collective self-
esteem (CSE; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1992) to gender, gender self-esteem 
is deﬁned as that part of an individual’s self-concept derived from being 
female or male (Burn, 1996). In the case of females, the identity component 
is how important being female is to their self-concept. The public compo­
nent is how socially valued they view females to be. The private component 
is how proud they are of females as a group, and the membership component 
is how ‘‘worthy’’ and ‘‘useful’’ they are to their gender group. For women, 
we predicted that higher scores on the identity and membership subscales 
and lower scores on the public GSE subscale would predict greater support 
for feminism. For men, high identity, membership, and public GSE scores 
were expected to be associated with decreased support for feminism. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Two hundred seventy-six general education students from 44 different 
majors at California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo served 
as research participants. Of the students, approximately 31% were ﬁrst 
year, 9% second year, 14% third year, 20% fourth year, and 25% ﬁfth year 
or greater. There were 181 females and 95 males. Age ranged from 17 to 
47 years with a mean of 21 years and a standard deviation of 4.48. Partici­
pants were predominantly Euroamerican (77%); approximately 1% of the 
sample was African American, 7% Asian, 9% Latin American, 0.4% Arab, 
1% Native American, and 3% checked more than one ethnic category. 
Materials 
Gender self-esteem was measured with an adapted version of Crocker 
and Luhtanen’s (1990) collective self-esteem scale (CSES). The CSES has 
high internal consistency, construct validity, and test–retest reliability. Al­
tering the instrument for a speciﬁc group does not appear to compromise 
its psychometric properties (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). A different ver­
sion was constructed for female and male participants. For instance, an 
item which read ‘‘In general, I’m glad to be a member of the social groups 
I belong to,’’ became, ‘‘In general, I’m glad to be a member of the female/ 
male gender.’’ A 7-point Likert scale was used to rate items. 
Support for feminism was measured with the short form of the Liberal 
Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (LFAIS). The LFAIS reﬂects the 
three general themes of women’s discrimination and subordination, collec­
tive action for women’s equality, and sisterhood. The LFAIS has good 
convergent, divergent, and known-groups validity and demonstrated relia­
bility (Morgan, 1996). The 11-item short form has high internal reliability 
and correlates signiﬁcantly with behaviors such as writing letters in favor 
of women’s rights, responses to sexist insults, and the recognition of sexism 
in a commercial. The LFAIS appears to be a subtle measure of feminism. 
It does not use the words ‘‘feminist’’ or ‘‘women’s movement’’ and therefore 
represents a more ‘‘covert’’ type of feminism. 
A closed-ended question from Morgan (1996), ‘‘To what extent do 
you consider yourself a feminist?’’ was used to measure self-identiﬁed 
feminism. This question was answered by choosing one of eight options 
ranging from ‘‘Committed feminist currently active in the women’s move­
ment’’ (8) to ‘‘I do not consider myself a feminist at all and I believe that 
feminists are harmful to family life and undermine relations between men 
and women’’ (1). This item pointedly refers to feminism and requests that 
the individual self-identify in regards to feminism. It represents a more 
‘‘overt’’ feminism. 
Procedure 
Two undergraduate seniors, one female and one male, collected the 
data during class time. They read the instructions aloud, emphasizing that 
the questionnaires were anonymous and that participation was voluntary. 
After collection of the completed questionnaires, the study purpose was ex­
plained. 
RESULTS 
Due to ordinally scaled data, Spearman’s rho was used instead of 
Pearson’s r. The perception that females are socially devalued (measured 
by the public subscale) was signiﬁcantly associated with ‘‘covert’’ feminism 
Table I. GSE Subscales and Feminism Correlations 
Liberal Feminism 
Attitude and Self-Identiﬁed 
Ideology Scale Feminism 
(Covert) (Overt) 
GSE subscale Females Males Females Males 
Identity .19* �.16 .09 �.25 
Public �.19* �.21* .14 �.07 
Private .09 �.16 .04 �.19 
Membership .30** �.21* .16* �.33** 
Overall GSE .15* �.28** .05 �.32** 
Note: For females, n ranged from 162 to 180, for males from 82 to 95. 
*p � .05; **p � .01. 
(support for feminist policies as measured by the LFAIS). In general, results 
supported the hypothesis that for women, high GSE would be associated 
with greater support for feminism (see Table I). For female participants, 
expressing support for the idea that they were ‘‘worthy’’ and ‘‘useful’’ 
members of their gender group was signiﬁcantly associated with higher 
scores on the two feminism variables. The hypothesized relationship be­
tween the identity subscale and the feminism measures was partially sup­
ported. Scores on the GSE identity subscale and the LFAIS were signiﬁ­
cantly positively correlated. 
For men, a strong GSE was associated with reduced support for femi­
nism (see Table II). The perception that males are socially valued (public 
Table II. Participants’ Responses to: ‘‘To What Extent Do You Consider Yourself a
 
Feminist?
 
Item Option Females Males 
A committed feminist currently active in the women’s 1.7 0 
movement 
A committed feminist 4 0 
Feminist 10.9 3.7 
I agree with all of the objectives of the feminist 8 4.9 
movement, but do not consider myself a feminist 
I agree with most of the objectives of the feminist 36.2 31.7 
movement, but do not consider myself a feminist 
I agree with some of the objectives of the feminist 32.2 30.5 
movement, but tend to be somewhat traditional 
I do not consider myself a feminist at all. I am quite 5.7 20.7 
traditional 
I do not consider myself to be a feminist at all and I 1.1 8.5 
believe that feminists are harmful to family life and 
undermine relations between men and women 
Note: Numbers refer to the percentage of respondents choosing that option. Items are 
from Morgan (1996). 
subscale) was associated with decreased support for feminist policies using 
the covert feminism measure. Feeling that one is a worthy member with 
much to offer his gender group (membership subscale) was negatively 
associated with both covert and overt feminism. High scores on the identity 
subscale were associated with low self-identiﬁcation as a feminist. 
As predicted, females scored higher on the identity GSE subscale than 
did men as indicated by a Mann-Whitney U test, z � �2.23, p � .05. 
Females had a mean rank of 145.27 and a mean of 20.21. Males had a mean 
rank of 122.87 with a mean of 19.03. 
Females were also signiﬁcantly more supportive of feminism. A Mann-
Whitney U comparing males and females on the LFAIS covert feminism 
measure yielded for females a mean rank of 152.72 with a mean of 61.64, 
and for males a mean rank of 88.05 and a mean of 53.60 (z � �6.63, p � 
.001). Higher scores indicated greater support and respondents could re­
ceive a maximum score of 77. Likewise, males and females differed on the 
overt feminism measure, an 8-point measure where lower scores indicated 
greater feminist self-identiﬁcation. Females’ mean rank was 142.32 with a 
mean of 4.01, and males’ mean rank was 99.16 with a mean of 3.14 (z � 
�4.52, p � .001). 
Table II gives the percentage of respondents that chose the various 
overt feminism categories. The percentages of respondents checking the 
various categories of the overt feminist measure differed signiﬁcantly, 
�2(df � 1, 7) � 29.81, p � .001. Phi (.34) was also signiﬁcant at p � 
.001. The percentages reveal males’ lower support for feminism and how 
few respondents of both genders call themselves ‘‘feminists.’’ Only 29 
of 174 females (16.6%) and only 3 of the 82 males (3.7%) checked one 
of the three options with a self-described feminist label. The largest 
percent of both females and males checked either the ‘‘I agree with 
most of the objectives of the feminist movement but do not consider 
myself a feminist’’ item or the item, ‘‘I agree with some of the objectives 
of the feminist movement, but tend to be somewhat traditional.’’ 
DISCUSSION 
Our results suggest that gender group identity is associated with sup­
port for feminism. The results corroborate past research ﬁnding that collec­
tive self-esteem is higher among members of disadvantaged groups. Like 
other recent research on support for feminism, we also found greater sup­
port for ‘‘covert’’ than ‘‘overt’’ feminism. In other words, participants were 
much more willing to agree with feminist ideas than they were to identify 
themselves as feminists. 
We found that gender self-esteem (GSE, or gender social identity) is 
related to support for feminism and that the direction of the relationship 
varies by gender. In the case of women, covert feminism was associated 
with agreement with statements indicating that being female was central 
to the individual’s identity. Surprisingly, however, overt feminism was not 
signiﬁcantly correlated with scores on the identity subscale. Overt feminists 
may see themselves as ﬁghting against the notion that gender should dictate 
one’s identity; however, further explorations are needed. Ideally, gender 
social identity should be measured in a broader array of feminists such as 
members of the National Organization for Women, members of the Ameri­
can Psychological Association’s Division 35, women’s studies majors, etc. 
One ﬂaw of this study was the lack of diversity in the sample. The feminist 
identities of women of color may differ from those of Euroamerican women 
since their struggles as women are often connected to the struggles of their 
communities against racism and economic exploitation (Collins, 1990). In 
other words, their identities as women are shaped by race, class, and gender, 
and these identities mold their particular experiences of gender oppression 
(Kemp, Madlala, Moodley, & Salo, 1995). More research on this complexity 
is needed. 
Covert feminism was associated with the perception that females are 
socially devalued. This lends further support to the idea that a disadvan­
taged group identity motivates equality struggles. Similarly, support for 
both feminisms was correlated with feeling like a worthy member of the 
female gender. We suspect that females may feel that being a good or loyal 
group member means supporting their group’s struggle for equality. Of 
course, the relationship could be bidirectional. It is also possible that females 
feel like good female-group members when they support women’s equal­
ity efforts. 
For males, the research ﬁndings suggest that a strong gender social 
identity may interfere with support for both overt and covert feminism. 
Beliefs that one is a good male-group member was associated with reduced 
support for both overt and covert feminism. Additionally, the more central 
being male was to the self-concept, the less support there was for overt 
feminism. Perhaps men who strongly identify with the group ‘‘male’’ per­
ceive overt feminism to be particularly threatening, especially if they stereo­
type overt feminism as involving the villiﬁcation of males. 
Although our research should be replicated with larger and more 
representative samples, our results point to the paradoxical nature of social 
identities—these identities may simultaneously enhance and erode support 
for equality struggles. Strongly identifying with one’s gender may be a 
powerful source of meaning and belonging and, in the case of women, 
forms the basis of a collective movement which has made great strides in 
increasing women’s status (Burn, 1996). However, the gender identities of 
men who view feminism as attacking males may be enhanced, since, ironi­
cally, they may see themselves as unfairly oppressed. Consequently, they 
may respond by being less supportive of the social changes needed for 
women’s equality. Indeed, this dynamic may be an important part of the 
current backlash against feminism. Our results suggest that feminists seek­
ing to increase women’s support for feminism should continue to emphasize 
women’s status as an oppressed group. For males, support for feminism 
would be enhanced by deﬁnitions of feminism and masculinity that do not 
view support for women’s equality as at odds with a masculine identity. 
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